By Altamush Saeed
For years, animal welfare advocates in Pakistan have found themselves making what should be an uncomplicated argument: that animals can suffer and that a society’s moral character is reflected in how it treats those who are entirely dependent on human mercy.
Yet despite the efforts of rescuers, veterinarians, lawyers, and ordinary citizens, compassion has often struggled to find a place in public policy. Community dogs have been viewed as nuisances rather than living, breathing beings worthy of compassion. Municipal responses have frequently relied on barbaric culling campaigns that satisfy public anger without addressing the underlying causes of population growth. Cruelty, meanwhile, has too often been dismissed as insignificant because its victims – the beizaban – cannot articulate their pain in words.
Against this backdrop, this year’s judgment (in late April) of the Islamabad High Court in ‘Nelofar v. Islamabad Capital Territory & Others’ feels like a watershed moment, not only for animal welfare law, but for the moral direction of Pakistan itself.
While the case arose from concerns surrounding the implementation of the ICT Stray Dog Population Control Policy, the Court’s ruling reaches far beyond the issue of dog management. At its core, the judgment asks a profound question: what obligations does a civilized society owe to living creatures that cannot advocate for themselves?
For me, the judgment carries a significance that is very personal. As counsel leading the petition, I had the privilege of presenting before the Islamabad High Court a case that sought not only the implementation of the ICT Stray Dog Population Control Policy, but also a broader recognition of the value of animal life within Pakistan’s constitutional and legal framework.
Having led the petition that culminated in this judgment, I witnessed firsthand the arguments, evidence, and principles that shaped the Court’s reasoning. Yet what emerged from the proceedings was far more significant than any individual case. The Court delivered a powerful affirmation that animals are entitled to protection not merely because they serve human interests, but because they are sentient beings capable of suffering.
Justice Khadim Hussain Soomro’s answer was remarkable in both its clarity and ambition. In one of the most significant statements ever made by a Pakistani court on the subject of animal welfare, he observed that; “Animals are not mere chattels or inanimate objects to be dealt with solely at human convenience; rather, they are living, sentient beings, capable of pain, distress, comfort, and social response.”
Those words may appear straightforward, yet they represent a significant departure from the way animals have traditionally been viewed within legal systems. Historically, animal protection laws have focused on regulating human conduct rather than recognizing the interests of animals themselves. This judgment moves the conversation forward by acknowledging something animal advocates have long argued: that the capacity to suffer carries moral significance.
Throughout the proceedings, one thing became increasingly clear to me: this was never simply a dispute about stray dog management. Beneath the legal arguments lay a more fundamental question about the kind of society we aspire to be, and whether our institutions are prepared to recognize that compassion and good governance are not opposing values, but complementary ones.
The ruling does not suggest that animals are constitutional persons. Nor does it erase the distinctions that exist between human beings and other species. Instead, it recognizes a simpler and perhaps more powerful truth: that being alive has value in and of itself.
This idea was reflected throughout the judgment. Justice Soomro noted that “life, in its constitutional and moral conception, is not a value confined to human survival alone.” He further observed that “an animal, by virtue of being alive, possesses a natural claim to exist in an environment compatible with its behavioral, social, and physiological needs.”
These words elevate the discussion beyond welfare and into the realm of ethics. The Court is no longer asking merely how animals should be managed, it is asking how a society should exercise power over those who are vulnerable.
That distinction matters. Because once suffering is acknowledged, indifference becomes harder to justify. The judgment repeatedly returns to the principle that recognizing animal sentience creates obligations for both the state and society.
“Once the law recognizes that an animal can feel pain and suffering,” the Court observed, “it necessarily follows that the state and its functionaries are under a legal as well as moral obligation to ensure that such suffering is not inflicted arbitrarily, unnecessarily, or in excess of lawful necessity.”
This is perhaps the ruling’s most enduring contribution. It transforms compassion from an act of personal charity into a principle of governance.
Importantly, the Court also placed animal welfare within a broader constitutional and social framework. It rejected the notion that concern for animals is a niche issue championed only by activists and animal lovers. Instead, it recognized the interconnected relationship between animal welfare, environmental sustainability, public health, and community well-being.
The judgment also embraced the internationally recognized ‘One Health’ approach, which acknowledges that human health, animal welfare, and environmental well-being are deeply interconnected. By recognizing that issues such as rabies prevention, waste management, disease control, and humane animal population management must be addressed together, the Court moved beyond a narrow discussion of stray dogs and towards a more holistic vision of public health and governance.
This is a sophisticated understanding of a problem that has often been reduced to simplistic debates about whether stray dogs should be removed from public spaces.
The Court’s rejection of indiscriminate culling is equally significant. Rather than endorsing reactive killing campaigns, it supports Catch-Neuter-Vaccinate-Release programmes as a humane and scientifically grounded approach to population control. In doing so, it aligns Pakistan with international best practices while recognizing that sustainable solutions require evidence rather than emotion.
Yet perhaps the most hopeful aspect of the judgment lies outside its legal directives.
Throughout history, societies have often revealed their values through the treatment of those who possess the least power. Animals occupy a unique place within that conversation because they are entirely reliant on human conscience. They cannot petition governments, instruct lawyers, or appear before courts. Their well-being depends entirely on whether human beings choose to care.
This reality carries particular importance for children. The way a child sees adults interact with animals can shape their understanding of empathy itself. A child who watches a thirsty dog being given water learns something about kindness. A child who witnesses cruelty learns a very different lesson.
It is therefore notable that the Court acknowledged growing international evidence linking animal cruelty with broader patterns of violence and antisocial behaviour. Humane treatment of animals is not simply an animal welfare issue, it is also a reflection of the values we wish to cultivate within our communities.
In Pakistan, we often refer to animals as ‘beizaban’– the voiceless. The word carries an unintended challenge. If animals are voiceless, then responsibility falls upon us to speak when they cannot. Not only in courtrooms, but in classrooms, homes, neighbourhoods and public institutions.
The significance of this judgment ultimately extends beyond legal precedent. It signals the emergence of a more mature conversation about our responsibilities towards other living beings. It reminds us that compassion is not incompatible with law, governance, or public policy. On the contrary, compassion is often what gives those institutions their legitimacy.
There remains much work to be done. Policies must be implemented. Public awareness must increase. Authorities must be held accountable for compliance. The cultural attitudes that normalize cruelty will not disappear overnight. But for those who have spent years advocating for the protection of animals in Pakistan, this judgment offers something invaluable: evidence that change is possible.
It demonstrates that empathy can find expression in law. That science and compassion can work together. And that a society does not diminish itself by extending kindness to the vulnerable; it elevates itself.
The Court concluded with a powerful observation: “To protect animal life from cruelty is, in essence, to affirm the moral seriousness of law, the constitutional value of life, and the civilizational duty of humankind.”
Few judicial statements have captured the essence of animal welfare so completely.
The ruling is ultimately not just about dogs, municipal policy, or legal procedure. It is about the kind of Pakistan we wish to build…one in which strength is measured not by our power over the vulnerable, but by our willingness to protect them.
The author is an award-winning Pakistani interspecies justice lawyer, educator, and animal rights advocate. The first Pakistani recipient of the Brooks Institute for Animal Rights and Policy International Scholarship, he holds advanced law degrees in animal law, human rights, and environmental law, and teaches Pakistan’s pioneering Animal Law Advocacy courses at various institutions, including Kinnaird College, LUMS and NUST. His work has been recognized internationally, including the Humane Society of the United States’ Diversity, Equity and Inclusion Trailblazer Award.
Header image: Ayesha Chundrigar Foundation (ACF)